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This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with 
incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behavior to change over time. A 
distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and 
instrument-specific enforcement can have a significant impact on the choice between 
subsidy schemes and reserves for conservation policies. The results suggest that it is useless 
to design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is not prepared to explicitly 
back the program with a monitoring and enforcement policy. In general, the regulator will 
prefer to use compensation payments, if the cost of using government revenues is 
sufficiently low, the environmental benefits are equal, and the cost efficiency benefits 
exceed the (possible) increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is too 
costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial. 
Keywords: Monitoring and enforcement; Policy instruments; Conservation policy 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade some major European biodiversity policies, such as the Habitats 
and Birds Directives (Council Directives 92/43/EEC and 79/409/EEC)
1, have been in place. 
The two most relevant instruments used in the EU conservation policy are reserves and 
compensation payments for conservation practices. These instruments are often 
complements but can also be used separately. In ideal circumstances, with perfect 
information, either policy instrument can obtain the same results. As Weitzman [24] already 
showed, in general exactly the same information is necessary to name the right prices or to 
determine the right quantities. Unfortunately, policy decisions are never made under perfect 
circumstances: the available knowledge is imperfect and often asymmetrically distributed, 
outcomes of policy actions show elements of randomness and are influenced by stochastic 
processes, and human behavior is not always rational. Moreover, it is often uncertain 
whether firms and individuals will in effect comply with the appropriate legislation. 
Imperfect monitoring and incomplete enforcement have proved to be very important factors 
in the practice of environmental regulation and they will be the focus of this contribution. 
Previously, Montero [17] has studied whether incomplete enforcement has any impact on the 
choice between price and quantity instruments. If the benefit and cost curves are uncertain, 
he shows that the quantity instrument performs relatively better than the price instrument. 
The reason is that the effective amount of control under the quantity instrument is no longer 
fixed, which makes this instrument come closer to a non-linear instrument. 
Turning to conservation policies, [14] state that the factors which influence the outcome 
of conservation programs can be divided into four groups: (i) the characteristics of the 
                                                 
1 The two directives are designed to create a coherent network of protected areas known as NATURA 2000.   3
resource, (ii) the characteristics of the group, (iii) the institutional arrangement and (iv) the 
external environment. Based on data collected by the International Forestry Resources and 
Institutions (IFRI) network, they find that rule enforcement is a necessary condition in order 
to obtain successful outcomes from local resource management. Also the European 
Commission acknowledges the need for enforcing environmental legislation and has recently 
adopted a proposal for a directive relating to the protection of the environment by criminal 
law [11]. Certain acts, such as illegal damage to protected habitats and the trade in 
endangered species, will thus qualify as penal offences, when they are committed in a 
deliberate fashion or by grave negligence, whether it be a case of physical or moral 
responsibility. 
However, in the literature little consideration is given of landholders’ actions once they 
have joined a conservation scheme. Therefore, in our model we allow landowners to 
imperfectly comply with a program’s requirements. The reason behind the imperfect 
compliance is that landholders’ actions cannot be directly observed and these actions can 
only be verified through costly monitoring, resulting in asymmetric information. Data also 
corroborate the assumption that compliance with currently implemented conservation 
schemes is less than perfect. Choe and Fraser, [5] and [6], mention the available evidence on 
the non-compliance with conservation schemes for the UK. For instance, in relation to the 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme, [16] found that on 24 percent of the sites visited, farmers 
were not fulfilling their contractual obligations. Giannakas and Kaplan [13] discuss 
compliance with the US program stimulating the adoption of on-site resource conservation 
activities on highly erodible lands. Since the inception of the policy, over 11000 producers   4
have been cited for violations on approximately 281000 acres with a total of nearly 16 
million dollars in denied benefits [7].  
Ellefson et al. [9] describe the results of a comprehensive assessment of state government, 
forest practice regulatory programs in the US. The programs focus on a wide range of 
forestry practices applied to private forests. The program administrators estimated that only 
in a very few instances forest practices were always being correctly applied. Practices such 
as timber harvesting, roads and trails and chemical application practices tended toward more 
correct application, while cultural, protection and administrative practices were more 
inclined to be sometimes or never correctly applied. With respect to the effectiveness of the 
programs, administrators judged educational and technical assistance programs to be most 
effective in obtaining correct application of forestry practices generally, while tax incentive 
programs were rated least effective. Financial incentive programs were rated slightly more 
effective than regulatory programs (2.81 versus 2.60 on a scale from 1 = least effective to 5 
= most effective). 
Previous models considering compliance to conservation programs, such as [5], [6] and 
[13], did so in a static framework and they focused on one policy instrument. We, however, 
explicitly incorporate the dynamic aspects of conservation programs into the model and 
allow landholders’ behavior to change over time. We also make a distinction between initial 
compliance and continuing compliance and focus on the difference in monitoring and 
enforcing compensation schemes or reserves. While most models assume that monitoring 
and enforcement strategies are independent of the type of instrument used, this assumption 
no longer holds when confronted with reality. As shown by [20], the type of environmental 
policy instrument dictates the characteristics and costs of the associated monitoring and   5
enforcement strategy. Indeed, we find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement 
can have a significant impact on the selection of conservation instruments. The results 
suggest that it is useless to design a conservation scheme for landholders, if the regulator is 
not prepared to back the program with an appropriate monitoring and enforcement policy. In 
general, if the cost of using government revenues is sufficiently low and if the associated 
environmental benefits are similar, the regulator will prefer to use compensation payments 
over reserve-type instruments, as long as the savings in the total compliance costs (cost 
efficiency) compensate for the increase in inspection costs. If the use of government funds is 
too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be socially beneficial. 
Section 2 discusses the model and derives the conditions under which landholders comply 
with conservation policies. In section 3 we describe the selection of policy instruments under 
incomplete compliance. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. MODEL 
We analyze a multi-period model with a finite horizon. This policy horizon is 
exogenously determined and is denoted by T. Typically T represents the minimal number of 
years a particular conservation practice must be implemented in order to comply with the 
regulation, i.e. the contract duration. A case in point is the US Healthy Forest Reserve 
Program (HFRP)
2, which specifies three enrolment options: 10-year cost-share agreements, 
30-year easements, and 99-years easements. Another example can by found in the UK 
Environmental Stewardship Scheme, which stipulates that a contract for Entry Level 
Stewardship Agreements lasts five years. We assume that landholders are subject to a 
                                                 
2 The HFRP was signed into law as part of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003. The program is 
authorized to be carried out from 2004 through 2008.   6
conservation policy and this policy might be based on a command-and-control approach 
(e.g. reserves) or a market-based approach (e.g. compensation payments). 
 
2.1 Assumptions 
We assume that landholders are risk neutral and that they maximize the net benefit from 
their land. The surface of each site is assumed to be equal to unity. However, the same 
person can own several plots of land. Initially none of these lands have been put to a 
conservation use and no conservation practices are being implemented. The start-up cost of 
changing land use practices in order to enhance biodiversity for landholder i is equal to 
i I  
and continuing compliance costs in later periods equal 
ii cI ≤ . These start-up costs tend to be 
higher than continuing compliance costs because they include learning and conversion costs, 
changes in suppliers or fixed investment costs such as building fences or planting trees. 
These costs of land conversion or of changing management practices vary between different 
landowners:  [ ] ,
i cc c ∈  and  ,
i I II ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦  with (continuous) density functions  () i gc  and  ( ) i hI  
and cumulative density functions  ( ) i Gc  and  ( ) i HI. We assume that these functions are 
commonly known to both government and landowners, but that only the landholders 
themselves know their real values. Due to these cost differences, it is necessary to explicitly 
distinguish between initial and continuing compliance with conservation policies. 
Previously, [15] has incorporated the notions of initial and continuing compliance in order to 
determine the quantity of abatement capital a firm installs when confronted with pollution 
standards.   7
In order to implement a conservation policy the regulator chooses between two 
instruments: reserves and compensation payments. When reserves are used, this fixes the 
number of sites that have to take certain conservation measures: qq =  where 01 q ≤ ≤  
denotes the percentage of the total land area that is sustainably managed. A compensation 
scheme determines a payment of s for each landowner who implements a particular 
conservation practice in each period. 
The regulator is also responsible for ensuring the landholders’ compliance with the policy. 
To this end, the regulator randomly performs inspections with a probability p in each period 
t. Every audit costs v and this inspection cost is high enough so that full compliance is not 
socially optimal. Further we assume that an inspection can perfectly determine the 
compliance status of the landowner; in other words, there are no measurement errors. A 
violator who is caught
3 in period t has to pay a fine  ( ) Ft. The type of fine that can be 
imposed depends on the policy instrument used. For a compensation payment scheme, the 
fine cannot exceed the cumulative subsidy amounts since this would imply less (voluntary) 
participation by the target group
4. Thus, we assume that this fine is equal to the cumulative 






Ft s s t
=
≡= ∑ . A European example where such a penalty scheme is used is the 
compensation scheme for afforestation on agricultural land in Flanders [1]. In the US, this 
                                                 
3 We thus assume that each violator who is caught will also be punished. So the probability of prosecution 
equals the probability of inspections. This is clearly a simplification since in reality the probability of 
prosecution is often significantly below the inspection frequency. 
4 A policy with a fine exceeding the cumulative subsidy amounts can always be reformulated as a policy with a 
lower nominal subsidy and a fine equal to the cumulative subsidy amounts. The model can thus be viewed as a 
normalisation.   8
type of fine is also often used in practice: for instance, the US Program for Wild Rice, Fruit 
and Vegetable Provisions states that, for serious planting violations, ‘all DCP
5 payments 
previously paid to producers for the farm for the applicable year must be refunded, plus 
interest and no further DCP payments will be made for the applicable farm’. The US 
Grassland Reserve Program also specifies that for violations of rental agreements or 
restoration agreements ‘the Commodity Credit Corporation may require the participant to 
refund all or part of any payments received, with interest’. This cumulative fine is the 
highest possible penalty the regulator can impose on noncompliant program participants 
without compromising initial participation incentives. Following a standard result from the 
economic literature on crime, we set the fine at its highest possible level so as to minimize 
monitoring and enforcement costs. As [3] initially demonstrates, it is often cheaper to 
increase the fine level than to augment the inspection frequency, in order to obtain the 
necessary level of deterrence. Several extensions and adjustments of this basic result are 
discussed, among others, by [8]. The restitution of all subsidies received so far means that 
fines are increasing in time and thus deterrence is also mounting over time. This increasing 
penalty implies that not all participants would choose to violate in the last period T, even 
though monitoring is imperfect. Furthermore, the sanction imposed on dissenting 
landholders also implies that the violators cannot receive any future subsidies. This is again a 
common feature of real life conservation practices. For instance, the US Healthy Forest 
Reserve Program states that ‘if the NRCS terminates a cost-share agreement due to breach 
of contract, the participant will forfeit all rights for future payments under the cost-share 
agreement, and must refund all or part of the payments received, plus interest, and 
                                                 
5 DCP stands for the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment Program, and this program falls under the 2002 US 
Farm Bill.   9
liquidated damages’. When a reserve-type instrument is chosen, the fine is exogenously 
fixed in the legislation and equals  ( ) F tF = . 
 
2.2 Compliance with compensation payments 
In this scenario, a landholder is faced by a subsidy scheme that offers a payment of s in 
each period t for T periods in return for the implementation of certain conservation measures. 
In each period t, each landowner i is assumed to maximize the expected net income 
it Y  of the 
land from t until the end of the policy horizon T. In the initial period,  0 t = , an individual 
will decide whether or not to participate in the conservation program by optimizing the 
following objective function: 
  [ ] ( ) 00 0 max max 1
NP P
ii i zz Yz Y z Y =− +  
with  () 10 z =  if the landholder decides (not) to participate in the program, 
0
NP
i Y  is the 
expected net income from not participating and 
0
P
i Y  is the expected net income from 
enrolling in the program. We assume that the landholders can only decide to take part in the 
conservation scheme in period 0 and that is impossible to subscribe in a later period.
6 The 
expected net income from taking part in the conservation program will depend on the future 
decisions concerning compliance with the requirements necessary for receiving the subsidy 
payment. In this model, we distinguish the initial decision to participate from continuing 
compliance with the program. Thus we have to examine the compliance decision in the last 
period  () tT =  and, through backward induction, we can subsequently optimize the 
                                                 
6 In practise landholders might enrol in the conservation program during several years. However, most 
programs specify a minimum period during which the subsidized practices should be implemented. It is this 
time period that is represented by T.   10
compliance decision of the landowners in the previous periods and the participation decision 
in period 0.  
 
2.2.1 Compliance decision of program participants 
In the last period T a landholder who participates in the program decides to comply with 
the requirements if: 
  ( )
CN C
ii i Ys c Y s p F T +− ≥ +−  
with 
C
i Y  the revenue if the land is sustainably managed and 
NC
i Y  the income from the land if 
no conservation measures are implemented. These revenues are assumed to be constant over 
time and hence we drop the time index
7. This gives: 
  ( )
CN C
ii i YY c p F T −− ≥ −  
The net cost of compliance with the program’s obligations has to exceed the expected fine 










≥− ≡ %  
If a landholder decides to participate in the conservation program, we find that his 
compliance decision can be described by proposition A. First, however, we define the 










≡− ∀ %  
                                                 
7 As [23] mention, the costs and benefits of conservation programs often exhibit variations over time and 
space.  In this model we do not specifically deal with this.   11
These parameters are always ordered as follows: 
12 ...
ii i T p pp >> > %% %  for all i, since per 
definition  () () ( ) 1 2 ... FF F T << <. 
 
Proposition A 
The compliance decision of the landowners who participate in the conservation 
program is described as follows: 
If 
CN C
ii i i cY Y c ≤− ≡ % ,  
then the landholder will comply in each period t, 0 tT < ≤  (case I). 
If  ()
CN C
iiii i cccY Y F T <≤≡ − + % %%  (case II), and 
a) if 
1 i p p ≥ % , then the landholder will be compliant in each period t, 0 tT <≤  
b) if 
1 it it p pp
− ≤< %%  for 1 tT < ≤ , then the landholder will comply from period t 
onwards until period T and violate before period t 
 c)  if 
iT p p < % , then the landholder will never comply.  
If 
ii cc > % % , then the landholder will never comply (case III). 
 
The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A. 
In case I, it is always profitable for the landholders to implement the conservation 
measures even without compensation payments. Indeed the conservation costs () i c  are 
already covered by the increase in private land revenues (e.g., fewer fertilizers are needed or 
the recreational benefits increase) after implementation ( )
CN C
ii YY − . Thus, the compliance 
decisions of these low-cost landowners are independent of the monitoring and enforcement 
policy. Rational landholders in a world with perfect information would already have   12
implemented these moneymaking measures. However, in reality due to, for instance, 
incomplete information, these profitable opportunities are not always realized. 
The high-cost landowners in case III will always decide to violate the program’s rules, if 
they choose to participate in it, since the costs of compliance are always higher than the 
highest possible fine that can be imposed, corrected for the change in land revenues. Even 
with perfect monitoring,  1 p = , it is not optimal for these landholders to comply. 
The compliance decisions of the medium-cost landowners (case II) depend on the 
monitoring policy. The level of the probability of inspection has to be high enough () 1 i p p ≥ %  
to convince these landholders to fulfill the program’s requirements during the complete time 
horizon. If the monitoring stringency is not sufficiently high, these landowners will only 
execute the necessary management changes when the product of the inspection frequency 
and the fine (i.e. the expected sanction) is high enough. Due to the increasing fines, 
landholders decide to comply once the expected penalty exceeds a certain threshold. If the 
probability of detection is lower than 
iT p % , these medium-cost owners will never comply with 
the program if they to decide to participate. 
In the special case of a fixed fine, the results would simplify since case IIb would not 
exist and program participants would either always comply with the program’s conservation 
requirements or always violate them.  
 
2.2.2 Participation decision 
Once we know the landholders’ compliance decisions after they decide to participate in 
the program, we can derive the conditions under which it is optimal for them to actually join 
the conservation program. We examine the participation decision at  0 t =  for each case   13
mentioned above. Remember that we assume that the initial compliance cost 
i I  is always 
higher than the cost 
i c  for continuing compliance once the program is started. The discount 





ii cc ≤ %  (case I) or if 
iii ccc <≤ % %%  and 
1 i p p ≥ %  (case IIa), then 
a)  if  ()
1
T
CN C t CN C
iii i i i i
t
I IY Y s Y Y s c δ
=
≤≡ − + + − + − ∑ % , the landholder will 
participate in the program and will always comply 
b)  if 
ii I I > % , the landholder will not participate in the program 
If
iii ccc <≤ % %%  and 
1 it it p pp
− ≤<
%% %%  (case IIb), then 





t CN C t
iii i
t
I IY Y s p s p F t δ
−
=
≤≡ − + + − − ∑
%
% %  
                       () ()
1 1
T
t tC N C
ii i
tt
p YY s c δ
−
=
+− − + − ∑
%
%
, the landholder will   
      participate in the program and will comply from period t% onwards 
b) if 
ii I I > % % , the landholder will not participate in the program. 
If 
iii ccc <≤ % %%  and 
iT p p < %  (case IIc) or if 
ii cc > % %  (case III),   
 then the landholder will not participate in the program. 
 
For cases I and IIa, the landholder opts to participate in the program under condition that 
the initial compliance cost 
i I  is not too high. If the initial compliance cost is higher than the   14
net present value of all future profits from the program ( ) ii I I > % % , the land manager will not 
take part in the conservation scheme, even though he would implement the required land use 
practices once he would have been enrolled in the program. Once the initial compliance cost 
has been incurred, it can be treated as a sunk cost and thus only the (lower) continuous 
compliance costs are relevant for future compliance decisions. If the landowner would never 
comply with the program’s obligations (cases III and IIc), he would also opt not to take part 
in it, since the initial compliance cost is even higher than the cost of continuing compliance 
() ii I c ≥ . If the monitoring policy is such that medium-cost landowners only start complying 
after a certain time (case IIb), we find that these landowners will participate in the 
conservation program if their initial compliance costs are sufficiently low. 
  
2.2.3 Discussion 
It is noteworthy that the level of the subsidy s does not influence the parameter 
i c %  and 
thus the number of landowners in case I is fixed. However, the subsidy level s does have an 
impact on the parameter 
i c % %  via the fine  ( ) FT. This implies that increasing the level of s 
allows the regulator to shift owners from case III to case II and, depending on the probability 
of detection, more landholders will participate in the program. 
Without monitoring and enforcement, only ‘case I’ landholders would be compelled to take 
part in the conservation scheme, no matter how high the subsidies are. In that case, an 
information campaign would suffice since these landowners always profit from the 
implementation of the conservation measures. So the results stress the importance of   15
including a monitoring and enforcement strategy in the design of a conservation schemes for 
landholders. 
Moreover, we find that it is possible to increase participation rates in our model if the 
subsidy in the start-up period is set at a higher level provided that the probability of detection 
is sufficiently high. This would allow the regulator to compensate landowners for the higher 
start-up costs, which is indeed a common characteristic in compensation payment schemes in 
reality. For example, the subsidies for afforestation of agricultural lands in Flanders are 
higher in the first period in order to pay for the costs of planting trees [1]. Also the UK 
Environmental Stewardship Scheme explicitly includes, in addition to the annual 
management payments, the possibility of contributions (for Higher Level Stewardship) in the 
costs “of a wide range of capital works to help deliver the environmental objectives on the 
land”. 
 
2.3 Compliance with reserves 
When the regulator decides to use reserves (CAC) as a policy instrument, the landholders 
in a particular region are legally obliged to implement certain conservation measures. Note 
that this is a special case of the previously discussed compensation payments with the 
payment equal to zero and a fixed fine. The percentage of plots that need to be sustainably 
managed is set equal to q . The landowners who are targeted by the policy can choose to 
comply with the rules or not. With a probability p landowners are inspected and, when a 
violation is detected, the violator has to pay a fine F  and he is forced to comply in that 
period, which costs him 
i I  or 
i c . Again it initially costs more to start implementing the 
required practices than to continue compliance with the regulation ( ) ,
ii I ci ≥∀ .   16




Landholder i's compliance behavior when faced with reserve-type regulation can be 









, then the landholder will always comply (case 1). 
If  ˆ








 (case 2), then 




t tC N C
ii i i i i
t
I Ip Y Y c p F I δ
=
⎡ ⎤ ≤+ − − −+ + ⎣ ⎦ ∑ , the owner always complies 




t tC N C
ii i i i i
t
I Ip Y Y c p F I δ
=
⎡ ⎤ >+ − − −+ + ⎣ ⎦ ∑ , the landholder is 
noncompliant until he gets caught and is compliant afterwards 
If  ˆ
ii I I >  and  ˆ
ii cc >  (case 3), then 







I Ip I c δ
=
⎡⎤ ≤+ − − ⎣⎦ ∑ , the landholder complies in period 0 and is 
in violation afterwards  







I Ip I c δ
=
⎡⎤ >+ − − ⎣⎦ ∑ , the landholder never complies. 
 
The proof of proposition C can be found in appendix B. 
A low-cost landholder (cases 1 and 2a) is always compliant, since implementing the 
conservation measures is less costly than paying the expected fine. Medium-cost owners 
(case 2b) will postpone initial compliance until the violation is detected and they are forced   17
to incur the initial compliance costs. Afterwards, because continuing compliance costs are 
lower than initial compliance costs, they continue to adopt the mandated conservation 
practices. The second group of medium-cost landowners (case 3a) start by complying with 
the policy in period 0 because they can save paying the expected fine for one period 
(corrected for the change in private land revenues with and without conservation). For this 
group of owners, these expected savings exceed the expected costs of having to pay 
i I  in 
period 0 rather than later. The high-cost landholders (case 3b) will never comply since they 
find it less expensive to pay the expected fine(s) than to pay the compliance costs. 
 
3. CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The regulator announces the conservation policy at time  0 t =  and commits to a 
monitoring and enforcement strategy. The policy instrument that is used is either a 
compensation payment scheme or a reserve. The selection of policy instruments for 
conservation policies has already been extensively studied in various settings (e.g. [22], [18], 
[23] and [4]). However, the influence of incomplete compliance on the instrument choice has 
not yet been examined in detail for conservation policies
8. The monitoring and enforcement 
policy is determined by the probability of detection p and the fine F(t). Note that the fine is 
exogenous when the regulator uses reserves, while it is endogenous in the case of subsidies. 
We also assume that the inspection frequency is constant over time. 
The regulator chooses the type and level of the policy instrument that maximizes the 
expected benefits minus the expected costs (i.e. expected change in social welfare) 
                                                 
8 Studies looking at the choice of policy instruments under incomplete compliance for pollution reduction 
policies include, among others, [17], [21] and [20].   18
associated with a particular conservation goal  ˆ q  ( ) ˆ 01 q ≤ ≤  for a region. This criterion for 
selecting policy instruments is also used in, among others, [24] and [17]. We assume that the 
conservation goal  ˆ q is the result of the political process, which is exogenous to our model. 
In order to be able to compare the two policy instruments, we need some additional 
simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the government only knows the expected 
value of the private revenues from the land with or without conservation measures even 
though in reality they vary over the sites ([2] and [23]):  
 
C C NC NC
ii EY Y a n d EY Y i ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ == ∀ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
Further we assume that  i c  is uniformly distributed between [ ] , cc with mass one and, 
equivalently, that  i I  is uniformly distributed between  , I I ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ . The minimal compliance cost 
c is such that 
CN C cY Y >− . This means that the landholders have already implemented all 
profitable measures and no one falls under case I. The maximal initial compliance cost I  is 
smaller than  ()
1
T
CN C t CN C
t
YY YY c δ
=
−+ −− ∑  and this implies that all landowners falling 
under case IIa will participate in the conservation program (see proposition B). Finally, we 
assume that the fine for the compensation scheme equals:  ( ) Ft s t =  and for the reserve 
program the fine equals a maximum
9 amount F . 
 
3.1 Compensation payments 
In order to attain the policy goal  ˆ q using subsidies, the regulator will need to 
simultaneously determine the compensation payment s and the probability of detection p 
                                                 
9 Fines are limited in reality due to wealth constraints and fairness considerations [19].   19
such that a share  ˆ q of all landholders participate in the program and comply with its 
requirements. This implies that, using propositions A and B, the variables s and p have to 












Ic q c c
si f o r w h i c h c c c q c c
δ
δ
++ − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦




  () ( ) ˆ




≥  and 0 1 p ≤ ≤  (2) 
In order to reach the policy goal  ˆ q, the total discounted subsidy payments have to exceed the 







⎝⎠ ∑  for all landholders with continuing compliance costs 
below  () ˆ cq cc +− . Moreover, the inspection frequency has to be sufficiently high to ensure 
compliance by the participants; 
1 i p p ≥ % . Note that low-cost landholders self select into the 
program when a compensation scheme is used.  
 
3.2 Reserve 
If the regulator chooses to use reserves as a policy instrument, the size of the reserve 
equals  () ˆ qq = . Remember that the fine in this instance is set equal to a maximum allowable 
fine  F . In order to make all landholders in the policy area comply, the monitoring policy 
has to be sufficiently stringent. From proposition C, we find that the probability of detections 









We can rewrite this expression as: 
  ()( )
CN C pF I I Y Y +≥ − −    20
The monitoring probability must be such that the expected costs of non-compliance exceed 
the expected costs of compliance (corrected for the change in private land revenues). Thus: 








Since the probability of inspection cannot exceed one, it is possible that condition (2) cannot 
be satisfied and thus that the policy goal  ˆ q cannot be reached without increasing the fine. 
As an alternative to setting the policy’s objective q  equal to  ˆ q, it is also conceivable to 
set the policy goal equal to one () 1 q = . This implies that the regulator formally forces all 
landholders in the complete region to adopt certain conservation practices. However, through 
the choice of the monitoring and enforcement strategy, the percentage of owners that 
actually comply can be set equal to  ˆ q. The probability of detection that achieves this goal is 
determined by using proposition C and the violators who are caught should not be forced to 
comply. This policy scenario is in effect an environmental tax scheme since landholders can 
choose to comply or to pay a fine with a certain probability (see [21]). Such an 
environmental tax scheme is likely to be politically infeasible. Moreover, the credibility of 
the policy is questionable because the regulator will be perceived as accepting non-
compliance behavior from a sizable proportion ( ) ˆ 1 q −  of the landowners. Therefore, we do 
not discuss this policy scenario any further. 
  
3.3 Impact on social welfare 
The expected change in social welfare from the conservation policy consists of the sum of 
(i) the expected environmental benefits, (ii) the landholders’ net income and (iii) the social   21
cost of government expenditures. Both policy instruments have a different impact on the 
three components of social welfare.  
Due to the assumptions we make, all participants with the compensation payment scheme 
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 (4) 
with  i B  the conservation benefit of plot i, ν  the cost of inspecting a landowner, MCPF the 
marginal cost of public funds
10 and  ( ) ( ) ˆ
CN C
S




≡ . Note that none of the 
landholders will have to pay a fine, since all program participants ( ) iP ∈  comply in this 
scenario. It is, however, still necessary to inspect them on a regular basis because otherwise 
they would start violating the program’s obligations. 
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10 The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) measures the distortions caused by the collection of tax revenue 
that is spend on public goods that do not influence private consumption. Each euro of collected taxes leads to a 
direct cost for the taxpayers (that one euro) as well as an indirect cost due to the less efficient functioning of the 
economy. After all, the transfer from taxpayers to government alters the consumption and labour decisions of 











 and all landholders that are subject to the regulation 
belong to the subgroup R  () iR ∈ . The monitoring policy is set so that all landholders in R 
fall under case I (in proposition C). Again no fines are paid by the landholders because the 
monitoring strategy is such that all owners comply. Under the assumptions we made, the 
probability of detection associated with a reserve policy will exceed the inspection frequency 
related to a subsidy scheme if FF ≤ % , with the parameter F %  defined as the fine which 
equalizes pR and pS. Conversely, if FF > % , the probability of detection associated with a 
reserve policy will be lower than the inspection frequency related to a subsidy scheme. We 
can assume that the latter case is the most likely one. Reserves are likely to allow for higher 
fines than compensation payments, since they are not faced with participation constraints. 
Reserves are, after all, command-and-control policy instruments, while compensation 
payments depend on the voluntary enrollment of landholders into the program. Therefore, 
we will assume that FF > %  for the remainder of the policy comparison. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The impact on social welfare by the conservation policy consists of three parts: (i) the 
impact on the environment, (ii) the effect on the landholders’ income and (iii) the change in 
the regulator’s budget. Compensation payment schemes and reserves each have a different 
impact on the three welfare components.  
The effect on environmental quality depends on the variation in conservation benefits 
over the different sites. For this reason, we cannot draw any general conclusions about the 
relative effect of both instruments. If the regulator knows which plots are likely to provide   23
higher conservation benefits, reserve schemes can be targeted toward those plots. This would 
imply that reserves can yield a higher environmental benefit than compensation payments. 
The use of reserves in settings with high conservation benefits is indeed something we 
observe in reality. In a situation where a failure to act has irreversible consequences (e.g. a 
particular species of bird becomes extinct) or where conservation is incompatible with 
human actions (e.g. the conservation of biodiversity hotspots or wilderness areas), reserves 
are probably the most appropriate instrument to use. Compensation schemes can be used, for 
instance, to stimulate conservations actions in an established agricultural landscape (e.g. to 
promote the planting of hedgerows or the creation of pools). In order to keep the analysis 
tractable, we, however, assume that the conservation benefits are equal across the land: 
 
i B Bi ≡ ∀  
This implies that both policies have exactly the same effect on the environmental quality 
since they both reach the target  ˆ q and hence the first terms of equations (3) and (4) are 
equal. The same situation would hold true if there is no information on the individual 
environmental benefits but only on the distribution of conservation benefits. The regulator 
would then assign the same expected benefit to conservation measures for each plot in the 
region:  () ;
i EB B i ≡∀ . 
Total landholders’ revenues under a compensation payment scheme will always be larger 
than under a reserve scheme. Firstly, the landowners are compensated – at least in part – for 
the conservation costs and, secondly, only the lowest cost landholders will participate in the 
program since compensation schemes are cost efficient while reserve schemes are not. This 
implies that the sum of the second and third terms in equation (3) will always exceed the 
sum of the second and third terms in equation (4).   24
In order to rank the two policy instruments, we also need to consider their impact on 

















− ∑∑ . The compensation scheme will always cost the regulator more than a 
reserve policy, since subsidy payments as well as inspection costs increase (forFF > % ). For 
FF ≤ % , the compensation scheme will still be the most expensive for the government if the 
increase in subsidy payments exceeds the associated reduction in inspection costs. 
Depending on the cost of government resources, we distinguish two cases. If the 
compensation payments are costless transfers ( ) 1 MCPF = , a compensation scheme will 
result in a higher level of social welfare than the use of reserves, if the reduction in total 
compliance costs (cost efficiency) exceeds the increase in inspection costs. In the second 
case, government funds are costly to use ( ) 1 MCPF >  because they are financed by 
distortionary taxes. Then the regulator will still prefer to use compensation payments if the 
marginal cost of public funds is sufficiently low and the higher inspection costs do not 
outweigh the cost efficiency benefits. However, for a high MCPF, the use of reserves will 
become socially beneficial. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper shows that incomplete enforcement has great significance in the regulator’s 
choice between compensation schemes and reserve-type instruments. Compliance with 
regulations cannot be guaranteed without effort from the regulator and this has its 
implications for the government budget. Monitoring and enforcement aspects should thus be   25
more plainly incorporated in conservation policies and part of the programs’ budgets should 
be explicitly earmarked toward this end. Evidence of a growing awareness at the European 
level can be found in the annex to the EC communication COM(2006)216 ‘Halting the loss 
of biodiversity 2010 – and beyond’ which states that “Key actions include… ensuring 
compliance, control and enforcement at national, regional and local levels” [10]. 
Unfortunately no further specifications are provided and the document only refers to the 
general observation that enforcement with EU legislation is a legal obligation for member 
states under the EU treaty. However, the European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2007 on 
halting the loss of biodiversity by 2010 [12] is more specific and  
“calls for urgent action by the Commission and Member States to adopt measures to 
prevent or minimise negative impacts from such trade on tropical forests, including 
bilateral agreements under the forest law enforcement, governance and trade 
(FLEGT) programme”,  
“calls upon the Member States to reinforce efforts to combat illegal trade in CITES-
listed species and calls upon Member States and the Commission to devise a 
coordinated response and actions for the enforcement of CITES”  
and  “emphasises the significance of full and consistent implementation and 
enforcement of the Birds and Habitats Directives (and) insists that the Commission 
and Member States dedicate sufficient resources and attention to this task”. 
Designing adequate monitoring and enforcement strategies is thus one of the upcoming 
challenges for European conservation policy. 
The analysis presented here shows that, if there is no information on the conservation 
benefits associated with each plot or if these benefits are equal across the region, the   26
regulator will weigh the efficiency and enforcement benefits of compensation schemes with 
the costs of using government resources to pay the compensation payments. The results 
indicate that the regulator will prefer compensation schemes, if the cost of using government 
revenues is sufficiently low and if the cost efficiency benefits exceed the higher inspection 
costs. If the use of government funds is too costly, the reserve-type instruments will be 
welfare improving.  
Obviously other considerations besides enforcement should be taken into account when 
modeling the instrument choice of the regulator. However, this is not the main focus of this 
paper. The current model could be extended by explicitly specifying the distribution and 
variation of conservation benefits over space and time. If the regulator knows which lands 
provide higher conservation benefits, reserve-type instruments have an additional benefit 
compared to compensation schemes since the former can be targeted towards these high-
benefit sites. It would also be desirable to consider additional enforcement strategies. One 
possibility would be to allow fines to increase with the size of the violation. Another would 
be to allow learning from the part of the regulator and allow the regulator to adapt its 
monitoring and enforcement strategy over time in response to new information with respect 
to the landowners’ compliance costs. Finally it is also important to note that in this model we 
assume that the costs of monitoring and enforcement are equal for both instruments. In 
reality this is not likely to be true.   27
APPENDIX A: Proof of proposition A 
We take as given that the landholders participate in the conservation program and investigate 
their continuing compliance decisions, using backward induction. A landholder will comply 
in period T, if 
CN C
ii i YY c p s T −− ≥ − or if: 
 
CN C




≥−  (6) 
If 
CN C
ii i cY Y ≤− , condition (5) is always fulfilled and these landholders comply in period T. 
Looking at their decision in period T-1, we find that these landholders comply if: 
  ( ) 1
CN C
ii i Ys c Y s p s T +− ≥ +− −  
The decision in period T is not relevant for the compliance decision in T-1 since it is 
independent from it. Since 
CN C
ii i cY Y ≤− , these low-cost landholders will always comply 
once they participate in the program. The same reasoning can be applied to periods  1 tT < − . 
This proves case I. 
If 
CN C
ii i cY Y s T >− +, condition (5) never holds, since  1 p ≤  per definition. These 
landholders will violate the regulation in period T. Since  ( ) ( )( ) 1 ... 1 FT FT F >− > >, these 
high-cost owners will always violate the program’s requirements. This proves case III. 
If 
CN C CN C
ii i ii YY c YY s T −< ≤ −+ , condition (5) holds and the landholders comply in period T 
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Since  () () ( ) 1 2 ... F FF T << <, we have 
12 ...
ii i T p pp >> > %% %  for all i. This implies that   
a) if 
1 i p p ≥ % , then the landholder will be compliant in each period t, 0 tT < ≤  
b) if 
1 it it p pp
− ≤< %%  for 1 tT <≤ , then the landholder will comply from period t onwards until 
period T 
c) if 
iT p p < % , then the landholder will never comply.  
This proves cases IIa, IIb and IIc.   29
APPENDIX B: Proof of proposition C 
We look at the compliance decisions of landholders when they are confronted with a 
reserve-type regulation. Again we use backward induction. 
In the last policy period T, we distinguish two cases: (i) the landholder has invested I (forced 
or voluntary) in a previous period and (ii) the landholder has in past never complied with the 
regulation and his violation has not been detected. 
For (i), the owner will comply in period T if: 
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CN C









Else the landholder will violate the regulation in period T. 
For (ii), the owner will initially comply in period T if 
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CN C









Else the landholder will violate the regulation in period T. 
The compliance decision in period 0 can be described for three cases. Note that if condition 
(8) is true this also implies that equation (7) holds (since 
ii cI < ), while the reverse does 
automatically not hold true. 
Case 1: conditions (7) and (8) both hold 
This implies that in period 0 the landholder will comply if  
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This condition is always satisfied for this case. Thus these owners will always comply with 
the regulation (in all periods).   30
Case 2: condition (7) holds and condition (6) does not hold 
This implies that in period 0 the landholder will comply if  
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⎡⎤ >+ − − −+ + ⎣⎦ ∑ , the landholder is noncompliant until he 
gets caught and is compliant afterwards since condition (7) holds. 
Case 3: conditions (7) and (8) both do not hold 
This implies that in period 0 the landholder will comply if  
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⎡⎤ ≤+ − − ⎣⎦ ∑ , the landholder complies in period 0 and is in 







I Ip I c δ
=
⎡ ⎤ >+ − − ⎣ ⎦ ∑ , the landholder never voluntarily 
complies. Only if the violator is caught and forced to comply, he will incur compliance costs 
for that period. 
This proves proposition C.   31
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